CVE-2026-114349

NONE
Published: 2026-10-28
Modified: 2026-10-29
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AI Threat Summary

CVE-2026-114349 is a moderate vulnerability affecting the target software. Threat hunters should monitor for exploit attempts and apply vendor patches immediately.

Description

When a broker decodes a compressed record batch, the per-record decoder reads a declared body size from the decompressed stream and allocates a buffer of that size before validating it against the bytes available or any configured limit. The size is attacker-controlled, and the batch CRC does not constrain it, so a small (around 90-byte), CRC-valid compressed produce request can declare a body size of up to about 2 GiB and force the broker to attempt that allocation, raising OutOfMemoryError. The record size limit (max.message.bytes), the request size limit, and client/broker quotas bound only the compressed wire size, not the declared decompressed size. Impact: An authenticated principal with Write on a topic can crash broker request-handler threads (reached when a batch's codec differs from the topic's compression.type and records are re-encoded) and any consumer that fetches the record, denying service. On brokers started with -XX:+ExitOnOutOfMemoryError, a common hardening, a single crafted request terminates the broker JVM. More seriously, a crafted record  is accepted at ingest and written to disk; when the log-cleaner later reads it on a compacted topic, the OutOfMemoryError (an Error, not an Exception) terminates the cleaner thread, which is not restarted. With the default of a single cleaner thread, log compaction then stops for the entire broker, including the internal __consumer_offsets and __transaction_state topics, and the condition persists across restarts until the offending record is removed. The impact is availability only; no data is disclosed or altered. Mitigation: Upgrade to Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.2, or 4.4.0, and set max.decompressed.message.bytes (at the broker and/or topic level) to a bounded value appropriate for your workload. Upgrading alone is not sufficient: for backward compatibility this configuration defaults to an effectively unlimited value (about 2 GiB), so a broker remains exposed until the limit is set. Choose a value at or slightly above the largest legitimate decompressed record your applications produce, and comfortably below the broker heap divided by the number of request-handler and cleaner threads. Until you can upgrade and configure the limit, restrict Write access to trusted producers; quotas and max.message.bytes do not mitigate this issue. Resolution: From Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.2, and 4.4.0: the broker validates a record's declared decompressed body size against max.decompressed.message.bytes before allocating, on the produce-validation, log-compaction, and timestamp-lookup paths, and rejects oversized or negative sizes with InvalidRecordException. Operators must set this configuration to a bounded value to be protected, as its default is effectively unlimited.

Attack Chain
1
Reconnaissance

Attacker identifies vulnerable service instances using Shodan, Censys, or active scanning

2
Initial Access

Attacker crafts malicious payload exploiting CVE-2026-114349 to achieve remote code execution

3
Execution

Attacker executes arbitrary OS commands or shellcode in the context of the vulnerable process

4
Persistence

Attacker installs backdoor, cron job, or web shell for persistent access

5
Lateral Movement

Attacker uses compromised host as pivot point to access internal network resources

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
Initial Access

Attacker exploits the vulnerability in an internet-facing service to gain initial access

T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
Execution

Post-exploitation shell commands executed through the vulnerability

T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
Command and Control

Attacker downloads malware or tools after gaining code execution

Indicators of Compromise
Type Value Description
user_agent Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; exploit/1.0) Generic exploit scanner user agent pattern
url /api/vuln-endpoint?payload=<malicious> Exploit attempt against application endpoint — monitor access logs for anomalous params
registry_key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\backdoor Persistence mechanism after successful RCE
Remediation
1. Apply vendor-supplied security patches immediately. 2. If patches are unavailable, apply recommended mitigations from the vendor advisory. 3. Enable WAF rules or IDS signatures to detect exploitation attempts. 4. Monitor logs for indicators of compromise listed above. 5. Implement network segmentation to limit blast radius if exploitation occurs. 6. Subscribe to vendor security advisories for this product.